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Factors Leading to Structure Loss on the Thomas Fire 
Rodolfo Uribe 
 
The recent surge in fire activity and the extent of displaced communities as a 
result of wildfire has increased awareness of wildfire issues nationwide (Syphard et al., 
2017). Climate change, population growth, and continued development in the wildland 
urban interface (WUI) has contributed to a growing body of research into the underlying 
causes of this continued destruction (Kramer et al., 2019). There is no doubt that 
statewide policies, such as defensible space or building regulations, are associated with 
home survival (Keeley & Syphard, 2019). However, the relative effectiveness of wildfire 
mitigation depends on a myriad of factors specific to individual communities impacted by 
wildfire. This study focuses on factors that contributed to structure loss as a result of the 
2017 Thomas Fire in Ventura, CA. Through spatial analysis utilizing GIS software, we 
were able to determine that defensible space played a minimal role in structural 
survivability during the Thomas Fire. Our research shows that fence type 
(noncombustible, combustible, or none) is a more significant factor at decreasing the 
odds of structure loss for homes experiencing wildfire under similar conditions. Effective 
wildfire mitigation relies on multiple factors, and government agencies must take a 
holistic approach rather than singular, “one size fits all” approaches to reduce the impact 
of future catastrophic wildfire. 
Keywords: WUI, wildfire, wildland urban interface, Thomas Fire, Structure loss, 
wildfire mitigation 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent surge in fire activity and the extent of displaced communities as a 
result of wildfire has increased awareness of wildfire issues nationwide (Syphard et al., 
2017). California has experienced record-breaking wildfires, both in size and 
destructiveness, for three years in a row (“Cal Fire Stats & Events,” 2018). The 2018 
Mendocino Complex,  which consumed nearly 460,000 acres, was the largest recorded 
wildfire while the 2018 Camp Fire, responsible for 85 deaths (“Facts + Statistics: 
Wildfires | III,” 2019), was the deadliest recorded fire in CA history. Future modeling 
projections related to the impacts of wildfire suggest a worsening problem, both in CA 
and nationwide.  
Climate change, population growth, and continued development in the wildland 
urban interface (WUI) has contributed to a growing body of research into the underlying 
causes of this continued destruction (Kramer et al., 2019). Wildfire ignitions are 
exceedingly human-caused; in fact, the Department of the Interior (DOI) reports that 
ninety percent of wildfires are human-caused (“Facts + Statistics: Wildfires | III,” 2019). 
Nevertheless, current efforts to mitigate the impacts of increased fire activity are not 
proving effective at preventing structure loss (Kramer et al., 2019). Traditional mitigation 
techniques, such as defensible space, have failed to yield positive results during extreme 
CA wind events, such as the Santa Anas (Keeley & Syphard, 2019).   
The focus of this study is the 2017 Thomas fire in Ventura County, CA, which 
damaged or destroyed 1,343 structures, was the direct cause of two fatalities, and, at the 
time, was the most destructive wildfire in California history. Fueled by strong Santa Ana 
winds, the Thomas fire consumed over 118,000 acres and hundreds of homes within the 
2 
first 48 hours (Nauslar et al., 2018). This damage occurred despite an aggressive, 
mandated vegetation management (defensible space) program and homes constructed 
with fire-resistant building materials. This research asks what role did defensible space 
and building materials play in promoting structural survivability during the 2017 Thomas 
Fire? Are there other confounding variables at play within the WUI that make current 
mitigation methods less effective at reducing risk? 
This study aims to assess the effectiveness of defensible space and other structural 
variables on home loss as a result of the 2017 Thomas Fire. By comparing neighboring 
homes, burned against unburned, it will be possible to conclude if pre-fire mitigation 
played a role in predicting home loss. By using Geographical Information Systems (GIS) 
software, statistical modeling, and Google Earth Streetview, we conclude that current 
statewide, blanket policies are ineffective at predicting home survival. Mitigation 
strategies should be developed to reflect the community in which they are to be 
implemented. Thus, this study reveals that homes exposed to wildfire under similar 
weather conditions, have similar topography, and have a similar home design to those 




Figure 1 Location of the 2017 Thomas Fire in California
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1.1. Statement of the Problem 
 In the last decade, wildfires across the US have destroyed tens of thousands of 
homes and caused hundreds of deaths (Syphard et al., 2014). Years of prolonged drought, 
climate change, a buildup of vegetative fuels, and the expansion of the Wildland Urban 
Interface (WUI) have made conditions in California especially vulnerable to catastrophic 
wildfires (Nauslar et al., 2018). As a result of increased fire activity and destruction over 
the last decade, a flood of mitigation policies and building standards have been 
implemented throughout California (Kramer et al., 2019). However, there is little 
empirical evidence to demonstrate the relative effectiveness of these policies on 
preventing home loss during wildfires (Syphard et al., 2017). 
 As such, policies instituted on a macro scale disregard the subtler spatial and 
temporal differences present in each landscape that dictate fire behavior and determine 
the effectiveness of specific mitigation strategies. Homeowners, for example, may benefit 
from upgrading a fence or their windows rather than spending money on defensible 
space. Thus, there is a need to understand the relative effectiveness of current mitigation 
strategies and to provide homeowners with realistic goals to reduce their risk.  
1.2. Research Questions 
1. Was defensible space a factor in preventing structure loss as a result of the 
2017 Thomas Fire? 
2. What overarching factors resulted in structure loss during the Thomas 
Fire? 
3. What are effective strategies for promoting structural survivability during 
a wildfire? 
5 
1.3. Purpose of the Study 
The focus of this research applies to the 2017 Thomas Fire in Southern California. 
However, within the context of wildfire mitigation, the results of this study can be 
applied worldwide. In order to reduce the impacts of wildfires on human developments, it 
is imperative that fire and land managers, develop appropriate and effective mitigation 
strategies that consider local factors rather than a “one size fits all” approach. Through 
spatial analysis utilizing GIS software, we were able to determine whether defensible 
space was a factor in home survival and the impacts of fence type on structural 
survivability.  
1.4. Definitions of Terms 
• WUI (Wildland Urban Interface)- The Wildland Urban Interface community exists 
where humans and their development meet or intermix with wildland fuel  
 (Federal Register :: Urban Wildland Interface Communities Within the Vicinity of 
Federal Lands That Are at High Risk From Wildfire, 2016)  
• NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) -The mission of NIST is to 
promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing  measurement 
science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and 
improve our quality of life (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2010) 
• Firewise Community- A Firewise Community is an NFPA program that teaches 
people how to adapt to living with wildfire and encourages neighbors to work 
together and take action to prevent losses (“NFPA - Firewise USA®,” n.d.). 
• NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) – The leading information and 
knowledge source on fire, electrical, and related hazards (“NFPA,” n.d.).  
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• Defensible Space – A 100-foot buffer of cleared or thinned vegetation from around 
buildings (or up to the property line)  to create a defendable buffer to impede direct 
flame contact and provide a safe area for suppression resources. (“Fire Safety Laws – 
Ready for Wildfire,” 2019) 
• HIZ (Home Ignition Zone) - The area where the factors that principally determine 
home ignition potential during extreme wildfire behavior (high fire intensities and 
burning embers) are present. The characteristics of a home and its immediate 
surroundings within 100 feet comprise the HIZ (“Home Ignition Zone (HIZ) | 
NWCG,” 2019) 
• PRC (Public Resource Code) – California law relating to natural resources, the 
conservation, utilization, and supervision thereof, along with mines and mining, oil 
and gas, and forestry (“California Public Resources Code Statutory History,” 2019). 
• SRA (State Responsibility Area) - Land where the State of California is financially 
responsible for the prevention and suppression of wildfires (Informational Report for 
State Responsibility Area Prevention, 2017).  
• LRA (Local Responsibility Area) – Land where the local municipality is financially 
responsible for the prevention and suppression of wildfires (Informational Report for 
State Responsibility Area Prevention, 2017). 
• FRA (Federal Responsibility Area) – Land where the federal government is 
financially responsible for the prevention and suppression of wildfires (Informational 
Report for State Responsibility Area Prevention, 2017).  
• FHSZ (Fire Hazard Severity Zone) - A FHSZ is a mapped area that 
designates zones (based on factors such as fuel, slope, and fire weather) with varying 
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degrees of fire hazard (California’s Fire Hazard Severity Zones California 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Office of the State Fire Marshal, 2007) 
• ROS (Rate of Spread) - Rate of spread is a measure of the speed of progression of a 
fire perimeter and can be expressed as the forward, backing, or flanking speed 




CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The 2017 and 2018 fire seasons were the most deadly and destructive wildfire 
seasons in California history (“Cal Fire Stats & Events,” 2018). Wildfires continue to 
break records nationwide; this is especially evident in California, where since 2000, 
wildfires have broken records, not only in acres burned but in destructiveness, 
suppression costs, and fatalities (Keeley & Syphard, 2019). The 2018 Mendocino 
Complex was California’s largest reported wildfire, consuming nearly 460,000 acres and 
causing one fatality. Theories abound about the cause of increased fire activity, such as 
prolonged drought, biotic disturbances, increasing development, climate change, and 
poor land management techniques. Regardless of the cause, however, increased fire 
activity and incidents of catastrophic wildfires in California are on the rise (Koss et al., 
1996). 
Despite an influx of new laws and policies developed to help manage the risks 
associated with wildland fire (Winter et al., 2009), residential losses attributed to 
wildfires continue to have serious economic, social, and ecological consequences. 
Historically structure loss as a result of wildfire has been attributed to housing 
developments near or adjacent to wildland fuels. Wildfire mitigation programs have 
primarily focused on reducing the number of hazardous fuels surrounding structures. 
Government agencies have spent billions promoting and conducting fuel reduction 
treatments; however, suppression costs, fuels treatment costs, and fire activity continue to 
increase (Syphard et al., 2012). Scientists who study structure loss are starting to realize 
that fuels treatments are only successful under certain circumstances. Whether a structure 
will survive a wildfire may be attributed to building materials, location, and land use 
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planning (Syphard et al., 2012). This lack of consensus amongst land and fire managers 
has left the public confused about the best way for homeowners to protect their homes.  
The relationship between humans and wildfire ignitions is evident in areas with 
high population density. Balch et al. (2017) reported that 84% of the 1.5 million fires 
between 1992 to 2012 were anthropogenic.  In California alone, the 2018 fire season 
damaged or destroyed nearly twenty thousand structures (“Cal Fire Stats & Events,” 
2018). The majority of these wildland fires are started in the Wildland Urban Interface 
(WUI) in areas with high housing density (Radeloff et al., 2018). Since 1990 60% of new 
homes nationally have been built in the WUI (Mitigating the Risk of Wildfires in the 
Wildland-Urban Interface | whitehouse.gov, 2016). Population growth and continued 
development have increased the number of urban areas considered to be in the WUI. 
Consequently, this has left California communities at an increased risk of falling victim 
to the devastating effects of wildfire.  
2.1. Southern CA Fire Regimes 
Large, destructive wildfires are not new to the California landscape (Nauslar et 
al., 2018). The Mediterranean climate of California with hot, dry conditions in the 
summer, coupled with months devoid of precipitation, lends itself to frequent fire events. 
The abundance of fire-adapted species across the California landscape is further proof 
that fire has been a part of the California ecosystem for millennia (Sugihara, 1981).  
While pyrophytic vegetation is uniquely able to withstand long periods of drought, it is 
also extremely flammable, thus exacerbating the fire problem (Kocher & Butsic, 2017). 
Southern California is dominated by pyrophytic plant communities, such as chaparral, 
which burns at high intensity. Chaparral fires tend to receive a lot of media coverage and 
10 
capture the public’s attention when they burn in urban areas driven by strong winds 
(Carle, 2008). Seemingly continuous development across the West, especially in 
California, has turned historically fire-prone and fire resilient landscapes into urban 
environments. 
Individual plant communities are uniquely adapted to their environment. Each 
ecosystem has evolved to withstand specific climatic conditions and endure the natural 
disturbances native to their environment. Before European settlement in California, 
conifer forests had a 10-30-year fire return interval (Carle, 2008), while chaparral 
dominated landscapes had 60-100 year intervals (Keeley & Fotheringham, 2001). Fire 
return intervals and natural fire regimes have been impacted by urban sprawl, population 
growth, and aggressive fire suppression. Wildfire is often portrayed as an unnatural 
disturbance or a disruption to natural conditions. However, wildfire is an essential 
component of ecological succession and can be a predictably regular ecological process 
(Sugihara, 1981).  
Typical Southern California fire regimes have seasonal patterns. California fire 
and land management agencies employ thousands of extra, seasonal personnel to handle 
the influx of fires during the hot and dry months of summer and fall. However, shortened 
fire return intervals have altered the structure of native vegetation, which alters fire 
activity, further affecting the native fire regime.   
Increased anthropogenic pressure on chaparral has resulted in a vegetative type 
conversion from brush to invasive grasslands (Safford, 2007). Annual grasses are 
considered light, flashy, 1-hour fuels. A 1-hour fuel takes approximately this long to 
reach ambient atmospheric moisture conditions. This means that it is highly susceptible 
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to diurnal temperature fluctuations and ignites easily during periods of extreme fire 
weather conditions, common to Southern California. As such, the majority of destructive, 
large fires have been a result of chaparral fires (Keeley et al., 2004). Often, these fires are 
ignited in grasslands or along roadsides and quickly transition into chaparral shrub 
communities and threaten urban developments.   
Southern California climate generally results in two distinct types of wildfires; 
rapidly expanding wind-driven fires (foehn wind events), and non-wind event, fuel driven 
fires that occur as a result of hot, dry conditions (Jin et al., 2015). Native plant 
communities and their associated fire regimes have evolved to cope with such wind 
events. However, urban dwellings are taking the place of plant communities and are 
being consumed at high numbers as a result of fast-moving wildfires. The buildup of fuel 
and further urban expansion into the wildland exacerbate the disruption of natural fire 
regimes. The Thomas fire is a prime example of the collision of fire-prone landscapes 
and urban development. Heavy fuel loading, fast-moving Santa Ana winds, steep 
topography, and high-density housing allowed the Thomas fire to consume over 500 
homes within the first 48 hours of the fire.  
2.2. Historical Large fires in California   
California history is littered with massive wildfires; records in destructiveness, 
size, and cost are broken nearly every fire season. In fact, since the onset of this study, 
the Thomas fire (Fig. 2) has been surpassed as the largest wildfire in CA history by the 
2018 Mendocino Complex, which burned 459,123 acres across four counties, nearly 
doubling the area burned by the Thomas fire (“Facts + Statistics: Wildfires | III,” 2019). 
Ventura and Santa Barbara counties, where the Thomas Fire occurred, are home to three 
12 
of the top ten largest CA wildfires (2007 Zaca Fire, 1932 Matilija Fire, and 2017 Thomas 
Fire) (“Facts + Statistics: Wildfires | III,” 2019). A Fire Resource and Assessment 
Program (FRAP) data set compiled by the California Department of Forestry and Fire 
Protection (Cal Fire) reveals that over half of Ventura and Santa Barbara counties have 
burned since the 1950s. (Fig. 3)   
However, these facts have not decreased the spread of development into fire-
prone areas. Increased focus on structure protection has led to fewer resources available 
to battle wildfires. As more people move to areas designed by nature to burn, land use 
planning will play a vital role in building fire resiliency. Determining where houses can 
be built and their arrangement may have more of an impact than trying to exclude fire 




Figure 2 Thomas Fire burn perimeter in Santa Barbra and Ventura Counties  
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Figure 3 Total area burned across Santa Barbra and Ventura Counties 
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2.2.1. The Thomas Fire 
The Thomas Fire began on December 4th, 2017, and was the product of two 
separate points of ignition. The first start was reported at 6:26 p.m. PST to the North of 
the city of Santa Paula, CA, near Thomas Aquinas College, after which the fire was 
named (VCFD.org). The second fire started approximately 30 minutes later to the 
Northwest of Thomas Aquinas College, between Ventura, Ca and Ojai, Ca near 
Koenigstein road and highway 150.  Fueled by strong Santa Ana winds, the two fires 
quickly merged a few hours later and would consume nearly 100,000 acres within the 
first 48 hours (Nauslar et al., 2018). 





 Fanned by high wind speeds, drought conditions, rugged topography, and 
explosive chaparral, the fire quickly spread across Ventura and Santa Barbara counties. 
While the majority of the structure loss occurred within the first 48 hours, the Thomas 
Fire grew more than 60,000  acres a day on two separate days, 4-5 December and 9-10 
December (Nauslar et al., 2018). The Thomas Fire was fully contained on January 12, 
2018, having consumed 281,893 acres and was responsible for 1,343 structures damaged 
or destroyed, many of those primary residences. The Thomas fire was directly 
responsible for two deaths and was indirectly responsible for 21 additional deaths during 
the subsequent flooding and mudslides in Montecito, CA, as a result of the fire-damaged 
landscape.  
2.3. Santa Ana Winds and Fire 
Fast-moving, wind-driven wildfires are common to the Southern California 
landscape (Jin et al., 2015).  Santa Ana wind events have been the cause of some of 
California’s largest and most destructive wildfires, including the 1961 Bel-Air fire, 1993 
Laguna fire, and the 2003 Cedar and Old fires (Fovell & Gallagher, 2018).  However, 
even within the context of Southern California fire regimes, the winds experienced during 
the Thomas Fire were extreme. Reports from remote automated weather stations (RAWS) 
across Ventura County, CA, on December 4th, 2017, reported maximum wind speeds at 
>30 m/s (gusts > 67 mph). A long-duration wind event, such as the one that led to the 
Thomas Fire, had not been documented for 70 years (Fovell & Gallagher, 2018). This 
same long duration Santa Ana wind event was responsible for several other massive 
wildfires throughout Southern California during the same period. The Creek and Rye 
fires in Northern Los Angeles County burned 15,000 and 6,000 acres, respectively. At the 
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same time, the Lilac fire in Northern San Diego county burned 5,000 acres and destroyed 
157 structures (Nauslar et al., 2018). 
Santa Ana winds are hot, dry, foehn winds that come out of the east or 
northeasterly direction from the deserts east of the Sierra Nevada mountain range towards 
the coast of Southern California (Raphael, 2003). The phrase “foehn winds” is a generic, 
collective title used to describe warm, dry downslope winds. They occur worldwide and 
throughout California under various names, such as chinook, sundowners, and diablo 
winds (Brinkmann, 1971). From Butte county in Northern, CA to San Diego, CA, in the 
South, annual winds have consistently driven large, destructive fires (Keeley & Syphard, 
2019). Foehn winds, such as Southern California’s Santa Ana winds can reach speeds 
upward of 80 mph and significantly reduce the effectiveness of firefighting efforts 
(Fovell & Gallagher, 2018). These winds tend to occur in the late fall through early 
spring and are critical meteorological and social phenomena due to their relationship with 
wildfires (Raphael, 2003).  
Many of California’s largest and most destructive wildfires have occurred as a 
result of wind events, with downed power lines often being the cause. As such, power 
companies across California are under pressure to turn off the power grid during wind 
events. This has obvious social implications as many residents do not have generators, 
and public facilities are not equipped to spend extended periods without power (Keeley & 
Syphard, 2019).  
2.4. The Wildland Urban Interface 
The Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) is the area where human development and 
wildland vegetation meet or intermingle (Kocher & Butsic, 2017). Fires in the WUI 
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threaten lives and communities and cost an exorbitant amount in suppression dollars 
(Bar-massada et al., 2013). The WUI proliferated in the United States from 1990 to 2010, 
both in the number of new houses built and landmass (Radeloff et al., 2018) (Figure 5). 
Ventura County, CA, home of the 2017 Thomas Fire, has added over 100,000 inhabitants 
since 2000. The rapid population growth in urban areas of California has pushed more 
and more people to the fringes of metropolitan zones, thus encroaching on wild and fire-
prone landscapes (Keeley & Syphard, 2019).  
This amalgamation of housing developments with the natural environment has 
generated substantial environmental conflicts. Habitat fragmentation, damage to 
ecosystems, the introduction of invasive species, biodiversity decline, and increased 
threat of wildfire are all consequences related to the expansion of the WUI (Radeloff et 
al., 2018). Despite the growing awareness of the impacts of wildland fire in the WUI, 
there lacks consensus amongst land managers and fire scientists as to what housing to 
vegetation ratio constitutes the WUI.  
19 
 
Figure 5 Change in WUI percentage from 1990-2010. WUI area calculated as the percentage of the state 
total in 2010. 
(Excerpted from Stewart et al., 2007) 
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According to the 2001 federal registry, there are three types of WUI: Interface, 
intermix, and occluded (Federal Register : Urban Wildland Interface Communities 
Within the Vicinity of Federal Lands That Are at High Risk From Wildfire, 2016). While 
federal wildland fire policy is generally based on this definition, it does not account for 
varying risk within each community (Radeloff et al., 2005). Fire suppression and land 
management on federal lands rely upon the parameters set by the federal registry. Thus, it 
is vital to understand the differences between the three categories. 
2.4.1. Intermix  
Intermix WUI is an area where housing and vegetation intermingle (Radeloff et 
al., 2018). These areas tend to be in more rural settings where homes are scattered around 
the landscape with large areas of wild vegetation and open space amongst housing or 
developed zones (Stewart et al., 2007). Intermix WUI has interwoven continuity between 
structures and vegetation across the landscape leading to a lack of a defined border 
between wildland and urban development. The density of structures ranges from one 
structure to every 40 acres or a population density of 28-250 people per square mile 
(Federal Register :: Urban Wildland Interface Communities Within the Vicinity of 
Federal Lands That Are at High Risk From Wildfire, 2016). Wildfire is an inevitable, 
natural process in most areas of the United States for intermix communities (Bracmort, 
2014). The mix of large amounts of wildland vegetation close to structures and an 
increased risk of human ignitions poses significant challenges to the development of 
mitigation strategies and for fire suppression activities (Shafran, 2016). 
 Many researchers have attempted to build on the definition provided by the 
Federal registry to more accurately define and map the WUI based on finer scale 
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modeling. By utilizing varying combinations of population density, vegetation type, 
vegetation aggregation, and housing density, scientists have been able to map the WUI 
with varying degrees of accuracy and thoroughness. (Bar-massada et al., 2013). However, 
each method has inherent biases that lead to inaccuracies or inconsistencies across 
differing landscapes (Caggiano et al., 2016). Relying too heavily on building footprints 
can result in inaccurate housing density, while misclassifying vegetation can alter risk 
perceptions.  
 Fire policy in regards to the WUI is reflected in the terms in which the WUI is 
defined (Bar-massada et al., 2013). The lack of consensus amongst land management 
professionals leads to misallocation of resources and inaccurate community risk 
assessments. The WUI is where wildfires pose the most threat to life and property, 
require the largest amount of resources and cost the most (Radeloff et al., 2005). 
Therefore, it is paramount that research scientists, land management professionals, and 
fire managers continue to develop methods to define and map the WUI in order to reduce 
the impacts of catastrophic wildfire.  
2.4.2. Interface  
Interface WUI abuts or is near to wildland vegetation (Radeloff et al., 2018). 
Large tracts of urban development and suburban sprawl are typical examples of interface 
WUI. According to the federal registry, the development density is three or more 
structures per acre or population density greater the 250.  These are areas with high levels 
of housing density adjacent to areas with at least 75% of vegetation cover (Stewart et al., 
2007). While interface communities tend to have less vegetation intermixed amongst 
homes, the density of the homes themselves acts as a continuous fuel bed in the event of a 
22 
wildfire. Fires in the interface WUI lead to higher recovery costs than a traditional 
wildland fire, as well as a higher number of people impacted than areas with lower 
housing density (Olsen et al., 2017).  Recent fires in California, such as the 2017 Thomas 
Fire or the 2018 Woolsey Fire, have impacted developments miles away from wildland 
vegetation and the flaming front. Interface communities are at higher risk during wind 
dominated fires as firebrands, or embers, carried by strong winds can start community-
wide conflagrations (Kramer et al., 2019).  
2.4.3. Occluded 
Occluded Communities generally exists within a city where structures abut an 
island of wildland fuels, such as a park or open space. There is a clear separation between 
structures and wildland fuels. The development density for an occluded community is 
generally similar to those found in the interface community; however, the occluded 
community surrounds or isolates wildland vegetation and tends to be less than 1,000 
acres in size. 
 Each of these three communities poses specific risk factors and obstacles for 
suppression activities. Moreover, the categories defined by the federal registry attempts 
to define the WUI on a national scale but fail to recognize the risk to communities at a 
smaller spatial scale. Homes destroyed in the WUI are influenced by specific local factors 
and need to be analyzed based on a finer scale model (Bar-massada et al., 2013). Thus, it 
is critical that researchers continue to develop new strategies to define and analyze the 
WUI. 
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2.5.  Defensible Space as Fire Defense 
The rise in fire activity over the last decade has seen the number of people 
directly affected by wildfire increase dramatically (Syphard et al., 2017). Climate change, 
coupled with population growth and the continued development within the wildland 
urban interface (WUI), has left California communities at an increased risk of falling 
victim to the devastating effects of wildfire. This surge in fire activity has led to the 
creation of strict defensible space laws and building codes designed to reduce the risk of 
wildfire (Olsen et al., 2017). However, despite new regulations, structure loss as a result 
of wildfire is increasing at an alarming rate (Syphard et al., 2017).  
To date, wildfire mitigation has focused on vegetation management in the 
wildlands, but little effort has been placed on homeowner responsibility (Radeloff et al., 
2018).   However, given that 99% of wildfires are anthropogenic and the inevitability of 
wind-driven wildfires across the California landscape, there is a need to move beyond 
strictly relying on defensible space to stop wildfires. 
A defensible space of 100 feet around structures has been associated with 
structural survivability (Syphard et al., 2014). Adequate defensible space also increases 
the safety of fire personnel conducting suppression activities. However, defensible space 
has been shown to provide little protection for homes during large scale wind events. 
Instead, urban ignitions have been tied to fire branding and ember cast driven by fast-
moving wind leading to urban conflagration (Keeley & Syphard, 2019). Images from 
catastrophic wildfires in recent years have shown communities decimated by wildfire 
while the surrounding live, irrigated trees are left untouched, leaving scientists to theorize 
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that adequately watered vegetation around homes may provide an ember catch during 
wind events  (Keeley & Syphard, 2019).  
 Rapid growth in areas prone to wildland fire has raised the wildfire risk 
nationwide (Radeloff et al., 2018). According to the US Census, in 2000, one out of eight 
people in the US live in California. As previously stated, the location and timing of Santa 
Ana wind events of Southern California are relatively predictable (Nauslar et al., 2018). 
Consequently, homes built in the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) in areas prone to Santa 
Ana winds are essentially treated as dead fuels when the inevitable wind-driven wildfire 
encroaches on these neighborhoods (Keeley & Syphard, 2019).  Thus, further research is 
needed to assess the effectiveness of mitigation factors specific to the WUI during wind 
events. 
 Since the beginning of the 21st century, California has experienced a dramatic 
increase in deadly and destructive wildfires (Keeley & Syphard, 2019). California’s 
insatiable development practices have increased the number of people who live, work, 
and recreate in the WUI (Garnache, 2018). The expansion of the WUI in California has 
allowed a relatively limited number of anthropogenic ignitions to destroy entire 
communities (Nauslar et al., 2018). While scientists agree that the WUI is expanding, 
sprawling suburban development has made it difficult to define the line between the WUI 
and urban areas.  
2.6. Building Materials for Structure Protections  
The recent increase in wildfire frequency and the extent of structure loss as a 
result of wildfire has led to increased research into understanding community 
vulnerability to fire and what factors influence structure loss (Syphard et al., 2017). The 
25 
number of structures within designated WUI areas rose dramatically between 2000 and 
2010 (Radeloff et al., 2018), as such, structure loss within the WUI has significantly 
increased over the last few decades (Hakes et al., 2017). These facts highlight the need 
for community planners to consider the broad suite of factors involved when considering 
wildfire mitigation strategies (Syphard et al., 2017).  
Historically, community wildfire mitigation programs have focused on fuels 
based hazard assessments and fuels management (Syphard et al., 2017). These strategies 
have given rise to mitigation programs, such as defensible space, which target vegetation 
that surrounds structures. However, defensible space has proven to be less effective 
during wind-driven fires where lofting embers can ignite homes far from the flaming 
front (Keeley & Syphard, 2019). The Kilcrease Circle community (Figure  6), which was 
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destroyed during the 2018 Camp Fire in Paradise, CA, is an example of a wind-driven 
fire in which lofting embers were responsible for structure loss rather than a buildup of 
biomass next to structures (Keeley & Syphard, 2019).  
Figure 6 Kilcrease Circle Neighborhood destroyed in the 2018 Camp Fire, Paradise, CA 
  
Recent studies have shown that structure loss due to wildfire depends on the 
design and materials used in the construction of the building (Syphard et al., 2014). As 
structures in the WUI are exposed to radiant heat, flame impingement, or firebrands 
during a wildfire, the actual components of the structure may determine whether it will 
begin flaming directly, smolder or resist ignition (Hakes et al., 2017). As such, many 
areas are enacting specific building regulations for all homes built within the WUI 
(Syphard et al., 2017). In California, for example, Chapter 7a of the California Building 
Code regulations apply specifically to new homes constructed in the WUI. 
Studies have shown that the essential factors in determining structure loss within 
the WUI during a wildfire are exterior siding, roof type, windowpane type, and window 
frame material (Syphard et al., 2017). These factors can reduce the possibility of embers 
entering the home during a fire, which is more critical to home survival than defensible 
space during wind-driven events.  Reducing the possibility of ember intrusion through 
structural fortification can increase survivability during a wildfire (Dicus, Leyshon, & 
Sapsis, 2014). Images from catastrophic wildfires in California over recent years have 
provided evidence that fire behavior in urban communities during high wind events has 
been driven by buildings rather than wildland fuels (Keeley & Syphard, 2019). 
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The Office of The State Fire Marshall of California is responsible for maintaining 
and amending the California Building Code (CBC) Chapter 7a. CBC Ch. 7a requires that 
all new homes built after January 1, 2008, which fall within State Responsibility Areas 
(SRA) and are within designated Fire hazard severity zones, follow specific building 
material guidelines proven to reduce the structural vulnerability. CBC Ch. 7a also applies 
to older homes being remodeled when a permit was issued. However, requirements for 
secondary or ancillary structures are vague and challenging to enforce. 
 Given these factors, homeowner education is paramount to the success of 
community-wide wildfire mitigation strategies. Homeowners must understand the 
relative effectiveness and importance of building materials during new construction and 
remodels to make sound decisions about what steps to take for successful wildfire 
mitigation. Preventing structure loss due to wildfire is not reliant on one single factor; 
instead, it is the combination of a myriad of factors that may differ from one community 
to the next. Thus, a holistic approach to reducing wildfire risk, including defensible 
space, building materials, and land use planning, is essential to preventing future loss in 







CHAPTER 3. FIRE POLICY IN THE US 
3.1. Introduction 
The Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) is the area where urban development meets 
or intermingles with wildland vegetation (Rahman & Rahman, 2019). While the concept 
of fires in the WUI is not a new phenomenon, structure loss to wildfire has increased 
dramatically in recent years (Hakes et al., 2017). Traditional mitigation strategies have 
mainly focused on fuel reduction programs to reduce direct flame contact with structures. 
Despite aggressive vegetation management programs and continued mitigation efforts, 
home loss under extreme wildfire conditions continues to be a national issue (Syphard et 
al., 2012). Recent studies have shown that housing arrangement and building 
characteristics play a vital role in structural survivability during a wildfire. As such, the 
WUI problem is beginning to be recognized as a structure ignition problem (Hakes et al., 
2017) rather than strictly a result of geographical location or proximity to wildland 
vegetation. Structures themselves contribute to fire behavior, exclusive of the wildland 
vegetation that surrounds them and should be included as fuel in fire behavior modeling 
simulations rather than as passive components of a dynamic system. 
The variety of wildfire codes and regulations that apply to the WUI are plentiful, 
with a considerable amount of overlap and redundancy. The breadth of codes and local 
provisions applicable to homes in the WUI can be confusing to land managers and 
residents alike (Brzuszek & Walker, 2008). Large multinational organizations such as the 
International Code Council (ICC) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
work to promote international awareness of wildfire issues, codes, and standards on a 
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global scale. Within the US, individual states have the authority to create and adopt 
regulations to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens on a local scale 
(Holmes et al., 2008). In this capacity, numerous county and local governments have 
established regulatory programs to reduce wildfire hazards in high-risk areas. However, 
the deluge of new ordinances and policy changes after catastrophic incidents have done 
little to reduce the number of homes lost every year. (Leyshon et al., 2014).  
Few states have adopted individual, statewide WUI regulatory codes. The 
majority of the US states choose to follow the National Cohesive Wildland Fire 
Management Strategy, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and International 
Code Council (ICC) codes and standards (Brzuszek & Walker, 2008).  However, these 
programs guide the development of policies, and the interpretation of such policies is 
debatable. The lack of an agreed-upon definition of what constitutes the WUI coupled 
with non-standardized mapping programs has resulted in ineffective mitigation programs 
(Platt, 2010). The lack of consistency amongst federal agencies has caused some western 
states such as Oregon, Washington, and California to develop their own WUI mitigation 
strategies.  
Despite efforts to standardize WUI regulations, inconsistency remains a constant. 
Even amongst Western states, other than California, where massive, destructive wildfires 
are frequent, there is little consensus on what constitutes best practices. In Washington, 
the extent of defensible space required can range from 30’-100’ and is slope and fuel 
dependent. In Oregon, defensible space requirements are determined based on fuel and 
roof type in up to seven zones around the home. Nearly all western states interpret 
defensible space differently with varying degrees of enforcement.  Often the extent of 
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mitigation efforts required relies on the homeowner to decide and self-report upon 
completion, which leaves regulations up to further interpretation and error.  
Compared to all other states, California, by far, has the highest number of 
ordinances relating to landscape features and building materials for homes in the WUI 
and the strictest guidelines regarding vegetation (Brzuszek & Walker, 2008). These 
policies are a direct result of numerous catastrophic wildfires that have occurred in 
California in recent history (Table 1). The 1980s, and into the early nineties, were pivotal 
in California regarding policy responses to catastrophic wildfire (Brzuszek & Walker, 
2008). California enacted the first statewide regulation in 1982 after massive wildfires 
burned across San Bernardino, Napa and Los Angeles counties with the requirement that 










Table 1 WUI Codes and Standards in use in California 
Policy Organization Description 
NFPA 1141 National Fire Protection Association Standard for fire protection infrastructure for land development in 
wildland, rural and suburban areas. 
NFPA 1142 National Fire Protection Association Standard on water supplies for suburban and rural firefighting 
NFPA 1144 National Fire Protection Association Standard for reducing structure ignition hazards from wildland fire 
International Wildland Urban Interface 
Code (IWUIC) 
International Code Council  IWUIC covers many of the same concepts as NFPA (Brzuszek & Walker, 
2008). It addresses regulations for land use and the built environment in 
the WUI. All regulations are supported by data collected from wildfire 
incidents, technical reports, and mitigation strategies form around the 
world. 
CA Public Resources Code (PRC)  
4201-4204 
CA State Legislature Provides requirements for the classification of land within the SRA per 
the severity of the hazards present in order to identify mitigation 
strategies to reduce the impacts of wildfire 
CA Public Resources Code (PRC) 4290 CA State Legislature Provides standards for infrastructure related to fire equipment access, 
safety, and minimum private water supplies for structures in the SRA and 
within an FHSZ. Maintains standards for fuel breaks and green belts to 
reduce fire activity. 
CA Public Resources Code (PRC) 4291 CA State Legislature Requires vegetative defensible space around structures of 100 feet, or to 
the property line, from each side of the building, including front and 
back.  The first 30 feet of clearance shall be more intense as this area is 
critical for home defense against wildfire. Insurance companies and local 
jurisdictions may impose additional requirements. 
CA Building Code Ch. 7a CA Buildings Standard Commission Establishes minimum building standards for the protection of life and 
property for any home within the SRA and in any FHSZ. Building 
standards are intended to resist the intrusion of embers and flame contact 
by promoting vegetative defensible space and building materials that are 




Policy Organization Description 
CA Fire Code Ch. 49 CA Buildings Standard Commission Provides minimum standards for the ability of a structure to resist 
intrusion by embers or flames from wildfire. Guidelines within the CA 
fire code are taken directly from IWUIC, NFPA, CBC CH. 7a and CA 
Public Resource Codes standards 
CA Health and Safety Code Part 5 
Abatement of Hazardous weeds and 
rubbish 
CA State Legislature Requirements for the abatement and management of vegetation growing 
on streets, sidewalks and private property in any county in CA, to include 
any fire protection district for wildfire mitigation 
CA Health and Safety Code Part 6 
Abatement of Hazardous Weeds and 
Rubbish: Alternative Procedure 
 
CA State Legislature Allows the board of supervisors to compel private property owners to 
remove hazardous materials from such properties. If the property owner 
fails to comply, the board of supervisors may authorize the removal of 





The first state-wide law specifically targeting vegetation (defensible space) came 
in 1985 with Public Resources Code 4291 (PRC 4291). PRC 4291 initially required 
homeowners to maintain a 30’ buffer, since increased to 100’, of defensible space, not to 
exceed the property line, around structures. Defensible Space is an area around a building 
in which vegetation, debris, and other types of combustible fuels have been treated, 
cleared, or reduced to slow the spread of fire to and from the building (Defensible Space, 
2008). The 1989 49er fire in Nevada County, California, which burned 312 structures, 
was the catalyst for the California legislature to enact fire-safe regulations in the form of 
Public Resources Code 4290, which further developed regulations for roads and access. 
The 1991 Oakland Hills firestorm continued to push new legislation towards wildfire 
safety and preparedness in residential communities with the Bates Bill. The Bates Bill 
requires Cal Fire to work with local governments to identify fire hazard severity zones in 
areas considered Local Responsibility Areas (LRA) (Dicus et al., 2014).   
These actions have put California at the forefront of wildfire mitigation policy. 
Repeat incidents of catastrophic wildfires in California have implored regulators to 
develop an abundance of new policies or expand on existing policies in an effort to 
combat the impacts of wildfire. These efforts, however, have had little success at 
reducing home loss in a state with an ever-increasing population. California leads the US 
in catastrophic wildfire occurrence with over 1.8 million acres burned (“National 
Interagency Fire Center,” n.d.), nearly 100 people killed, and over 20,000 structures lost 
during the 2018 fire season alone (“Facts + Statistics: Wildfires | III,” 2019). Catastrophic 
wildfires, however, are an annual disturbance amongst all Western states. Most states 
have some form of regulations regarding wildfire hazards.  
34 
This study aims to summarize pertinent WUI codes and regulations in the western 
US. California, as a leader in wildfire mitigation, will be the focus of this study, to 
include the six contract counties (Santa Barbara, Kern, Orange, Los Angeles, Marin, and 
Ventura). However, relevant regulations from neighboring western states will be 
provided as reference.  
Contract counties are provided funding by the State to provide fire protection and 
prevention services to state responsibility area (SRA) lands within their boundaries 
(Informational Report for State Responsibility Area Prevention, 2017). State 
responsibility areas are lands where the State of California is financially responsible for 
the prevention and suppression of wildfires. All land in California falls into one of three 
categories regarding financial responsibility for fire suppression and prevention (Fig. 7). 
Local responsibility areas (LRA) apply to local municipalities and lands that fall within 
city or town limits. Federal responsibility areas are lands managed by federal agencies 
such as the US Forest Service (USFS), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of 











The primary focus of this study is the current WUI codes and standards in use in 
California. WUI codes and standards in other western states are included as a reference 
and for comparison purposes. Additionally, this summary will focus on these policies, 
which represent practical solutions for individual homeowners to reduce the risk of 
structure loss in the event of wildfire within the context of the WUI.  
3.2. Methods 
California is a leader in wildfire mitigation practices, policies, and regulations in 
the WUI. Owing to the propensity of destructive wildfire, population growth, and 
increasing development into the WUI, California has more comprehensive and strict 
wildland fire protection standards of any state (Brzuszek & Walker, 2008).  
We collected data on national and statewide WUI mitigation programs in use 
throughout western US states from multiple jurisdictions. We compared and analyzed 
standard best practices in use regarding building materials and defensible space. Many of 
them overlap or have subtle differences based on jurisdiction. Further, some counties 
have created stricter codes for areas which lie in Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones 
(VHFHSZ). Fire hazard severity zones are established and defined by the California 
Department of Fire and Forestry and are described in detail in the following section. 
Additionally, we developed a matrix describing specifics for common mitigation 




3.3. Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZ) 
3.3.1. CA Public Resource Codes (PRC) 4201-4204  
Senate Bill 81, passed in 1982, requires the California Department of Forestry and 
Fire Protection (Cal Fire) to establish Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZs) within State 
Responsibility Areas (Fig. 8). FHSZs are rated as moderate, high, or very high severity 
zones based on fuels, topography, weather, and other relevant factors influencing fire 
behavior. The goal of FHSZs is to provide specific designations for the application of 
mitigation activities, which include defensible space, and the use of specific building 
materials within the WUI. Initially, however, FHSZ designation only included homes 
under Direct Protection Authority (DPA) of the State fire protection agency and therefore 
did not have the authority to enforce policies on federal responsibility area (FRA) or on 
local responsibility areas (LRA). 
As a result of the 1991 Oakland Hills fire, which burned mostly within the LRA, 
the 1992 Bates Bill required Cal Fire to work with local jurisdictions to establish High 
(HFHSZ) and Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones (VHFHSZ). LRA typically consists 
of land that falls within incorporated cities, cultivated agricultural lands, and non-
flammable areas in unincorporated areas.   
Local governments may choose not to accept designations due to fear of losing 
home insurance, increased home insurance costs, lower property values, and increased 
construction costs (Leyshon et al., 2014). Further, LRA lands are only included if the 
parcel is designated as a VHFHSZ and if the local jurisdiction has elected to accept the 
state’s recommended designation. This lack of consistency across jurisdictions leaves a 
patchwork of communities throughout California where mitigation efforts have been 
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achieved while others have not. This dichotomy presents issues to fire managers when 
attempting to achieve landscape-level mitigation strategies. 
Moreover, FHSZ designations identify the potential fire hazard (not risk) in a 
given area in the absence of mitigation activities. “Hazard” is defined here as the physical 
condition that can lead to damage to a particular asset or resource. Thus, fire hazard 
involves the physical conditions related to fire and its ability to cause damage (Leyshon 
et al., 2014). Therefore, fire hazard only refers to the potential fire behavior and fire 
activity of the fire itself under certain circumstances. Risk, however, is defined as the 
likelihood of loss by wildfire (Leyshon et al., 2014). Thus, a home designated as being in 
a VHFHSZ might be at low risk of loss due to proper construction materials and 
maintenance of vegetative fuels. Similarly, a home might be in a moderate FHSZ (the 
lowest designation) but be at high risk of burning if the home is constructed with 
combustible materials and has dense, flammable vegetation that abuts the structure.  
Given the confusing nature of FHSZ designation, it may be difficult for 
homeowners to decipher their actual risk and, therefore, have difficulties choosing 
effective mitigation strategies. Furthermore, FHSZs are rarely updated, and severity 
status does not change regardless of mitigation efforts. Thus, it is difficult for 
homeowners to know if their efforts have made any difference. Once a home is identified 
as belonging in an HFHSZ, it will remain in an HFHSZ despite mitigation effort
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Figure 8 CA Fire Hazard Severity Zones 
 
40 
3.4. Vegetative defensible space and fuel modifications for structure protection 
A study by Syphard et al. (2017) demonstrated that defensible space is indeed a 
factor in structural survivability during a wildfire. However, the extent of defensible 
space necessary varies based on local factors and is not effective beyond 58’ from the 
structure (Syphard et al., 2017). There have been numerous studies that suggest that a 
reduction in flammable vegetation from the immediate vicinity of structures will reduce 
the risk of ignition from radiant heat and direct flame contact; however, enforcement is 
variable (Hakes et al., 2017). Firewise guidelines, National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA) and the International Code Council (ICC) WUI code recommend the 
maintenance of the Home Ignition Zone (HIZ) to prevent the transmission of small 
flames via vegetation or debris piles on to adjacent homes. Firewise USA defines the HIZ 
as “an area that includes your home and its immediate surroundings.” The HIZ, as 
defined by the IWUIC and NFPA, is divided into three zones from the structure (0-5’ 
immediate zone, 5’-30’ intermediate zone, and 30’100’ extended zone). CA PRC 4291 
divides defensible space into two zones while some contract counties extend defensible 
space to 200’ for homes in a VHFHSZ. Theoretically, the reduction in fuel and debris 
from the structure prevents direct flame impingement and a safe area for suppression 
resources. Given this focus on vegetation management for structure protection, the 
traditional strategy of fuel reduction around homes continues to receive most of the 
attention (Syphard et al., 2014) and shape community-wide mitigation efforts. 
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California has several state regulations addressing defensible space around homes 
within the SRA; PRC 4290, PRC 4291, and Title 14 of the Natural Resources Code. PRC 
4290 addresses firefighter access, infrastructure, and fuel breaks around communities 
designated as being within an FHSZ. Title 14 of the Natural Resources Code (CCR 1299) 
and PRC 4291 deal more directly with vegetation immediately adjacent to the home and 
separates defensible space into two zones. The first zone (Zone 1) extends from the 
structure out to 30’ or the property line and has more restrictive vegetation requirements 
than zone two. Zone 2 extends 30’ to 100’ from the structure or property line, whichever 
comes first (Fig. 9).  
Figure 9 PRC 4291 Defensible Space Zones. (CalFire.ca.gov) 
PRC 4291 states, “Fuels shall be maintained in a condition so that a wildfire 
burning under average weather conditions would be unlikely to ignite the structure” 
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(California Legislative Information, n.d.). However, scientific research is weak on the 
actual effectiveness of vegetation modification to reduce structure loss, and most 
recommendations regarding defensible space are based on expert opinion (Syphard et al., 
2014). California landscapes are subject to extreme winds, and vegetation is often not a 
factor in fire spread, rather urban conflagrations driven by high winds and ember cast are 
to blame for structure loss (Keeley & Syphard, 2019). The 2017 Tubbs Fire in Santa 
Rosa, CA, the 2017 Thomas Fire in Ventura, CA, and the 2018 Camp Fire in Paradise, 
CA, are all examples of fast, wind-driven fires that burned under extreme conditions and 
collectively resulted in 25,510 buildings destroyed (Keeley & Syphard, 2019).  
Some counties in California have taken a stricter approach to defensible space. 
Marin and Los Angeles county, for example, require defensible space up to 200’ feet 
from the structure and 10’ clearances around driveways and access routes. Additionally, 
developments and local municipalities across California have established their own 
guidelines that reflect local topographic and weather conditions. A California Senate Bill 
(SB 1618) was introduced in 2008 to relax environmental restrictions and to encourage 
increasing defensible space requirements to 300 feet (Syphard et al., 2014). However, 
these regulations are the result of the assumption that fuel is the primary driver of 
wildfire despite a lack of empirical data (Syphard et al., 2012).  
Throughout the West, defensible space policy varies considerably. Some 
jurisdictions require up to 300,’ and non-compliance is punishable with fines, while in 
other areas, only 30’ is recommended and self-reported. Table 2 lists defensible space 
guidelines appliable throughout California and across other western states. National and 
statewide guidelines are included for reference as well as local policies specific to Santa 
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Barbara and Ventura cities, both of which were impacted by the 2017 Thomas fire. 
Without mandated federal regulations, states are left to develop their own defensible 
space requirements. This has created a patchwork of confusing defensible space 
regulations throughout the West.  
Furthermore, defensible space policy takes a uniform approach, or blanket policy, 
towards the reduction of the impacts of wildfire (Kramer et al., 2019). The fire 
environment is dynamic; different landscapes present multiple variables to the wildfire  
problem. As such, mitigation strategies should be developed to reflect the unique 
challenges present in each community. For example, defensible space may be more 
practical in intermix WUI where homes are spread out and have significant amounts of 
vegetation between them. Whereas vegetation in high density, interface WUI 
communities is less of a factor during wildfires, and structure loss may be a result of 






Table 2 Defensible Space Policies and Guidelines Across Western States. 
Agency/Jurisdiction Defensible Space Building Components 
Cal Fire (PRC 4291) 2 zones 
• 0-30’ 
• 30’-100’ 
CBC Ch. 7a 
 
Federal Agencies 













CBC Ch. 7a 
 






CBC Ch. 7a 
 
Santa Barbara County (Contract) 
(VHFHSZ) 




CBC Ch. 7a 
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Agency/Jurisdiction Defensible Space Building Components 







0’-10’ (Access zone) 
CBC Ch. 7a 
Kern County (Contract) 
(All SRA) 
      2 zones 
• 0’-30’ 
• 30’-100’ 
CBC Ch. 7a 
 






• 0’-10’ (access zone) 
CBC Ch. 7a 
 




CBC Ch. 7a 







Agency/Jurisdiction Defensible Space Building Components 









Oregon 7 zones (fuel and roof dependent) 
• Distances based on risk analysis 
 
IWUIC 
















Agency/Jurisdiction Defensible Space Building Components 



























ICC  Site Specific IWUIC 
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3.5 Building Materials 
Homes in the WUI burn either by direct flame contact, radiant heat from flames, 
or exposure to firebrands (Hakes et al., 2017). Once ignited, homes in high-density 
interface communities act as a continuous, dry fuel bed (Keeley & Syphard, 2019). 
Wildfires driven by extreme winds can quickly overcome entire communities and 
overwhelm suppression resources. The thermal energy produced by burning homes can 
significantly influence fire activity (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2010). Therefore, understanding why and how structures ignite is paramount to reducing 
future structure loss during a catastrophic wildfire.   
Three existing national and statewide building codes and standards guide most 
wildfire resistant construction. While many jurisdictions have established their own 
codes, they are based on standards established by:  
• The International Code Council’s International Wildland Urban Interface 
Code (IWUIC) 
• The National Fire Protection Association’s Standard for Reducing Structure 
Ignition Hazards from Wildland Fire (Standard 1144) 
• The California Building Code Chapter 7A—Materials and Construction 
Methods for Exterior Wildfire Exposure 
The IWUIC, NFPA 1144, and Chapter 7A generally distinguish between the 
performance of construction materials and their exposure to wildfire. While each standard 
offers protection against direct flame contact and ember exposure, there are discrepancies 
amongst them, which can lead to confusion by homeowners about best practices. The 
IWUIC and NFPA guidelines, for example, differ from CBC Ch. 7a regarding decking 
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material. NFPA and IWUIC require that all decking material be constructed of ignition 
resistant material or one-hour fire rated heavy timber (Table 3). CBC Ch. 7a only requires 
that deck walking surfaces meet the same standards.    
Home attachments such as decking and fencing materials are significant elements 
determining structural survivability during a wildfire. Jurisdictional boundaries are 
arbitrary in reference to wildfire mitigation. If embers manage to ignite the underside of a 
deck of a home following the less strict CBC Ch.7a guidelines, the probability of a 
neighboring home catching fire increases dramatically regardless of which set of 
guidelines they are following.  
 Multiple studies have shown that four main components are responsible for 
structural loss during a wildfire: Roofing material, window panes, exterior siding, and 
eave assembly (Bowditch et al., 2006). More research, however, is necessary to 
determine the structural ignitability via home attachments. Inconsistent guidelines and 
weak enforcement are only adding to the wildfire risk for communities living within the 
WUI. Table 3 offers a side by side comparison for NFPA, IWUIC, and CBC Ch. 7a 
guidelines and standards for construction materials in the WUI and is followed by 
explanations for each section. 
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Table 3 Comparison of WUI Codes and Standards.  
 
Comparison of WUI Codes and Standards 
Component IWUIC (2018) Ignition-Resistant 
Class 1 
NFPA 1144 (2018) California Building Code 
Chapter 7A (2013) 
Roof 
Roof Class A fire-rated roof covering required. 
Plug gaps at the end (bird stop) and 
underlayment full length of any valleys 
Class A fire-rated covering required. 
Roof covering must be tested using all 
components in the as-built assembly. 
Where gaps exist between covering and 
roof deck, a rolling roof product shall be 
laid over the entire deck surface and 
gaps and end of ridge plugged with 
noncombustible material.  
Requires a fire-rated covering, actual 
rating (Class A, B or C) dependent on 
fire hazard severity zone. Plug gaps at 
ends (bird-stop, fire stop) A minimum 
36-inch-wide cap sheet must be 
installed under metal valley flashing. 
Eaves & Fascia Eaves and soffits protected by ignition-
resistant material or one-hour fire 
resistant rated construction, or 1-ince fire-
resistant treated lumber, or 3/4 -inch 
plywood. Fascia required, protected by 
ignition-resistant material or 1-hour fire-
resistant-rated construction, or 2-inch 
dimensional lumber.  
Eaves must be enclosed with fire-
retardant treated wood, ignition-resistant 
materials, noncombustible materials, or 
materials exhibiting resistance to 
wildfire penetration. Metal drip-edge 
required on eave edges. 
Soffited or open eave allowed. If 
open-eave, nominal 2x material 
required as backing. 
 
 
Gutters Noncombustible gutter (vinyl gutters not 
allowed). Use of gutter cover is required. 
Use of noncombustible gutter and gutter 
cover device required. 
Metal or vinyl gutters allowed. 
Installation of a gutter cover required. 
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Comparison of WUI Codes and Standards 
Component IWUIC (2018) Ignition-Resistant 
Class 1 
NFPA 1144 (2018) California Building Code 
Chapter 7A (2013) 
Vents Vents covered by ¼-inch mesh screen. 
Vents in exterior walls shall not exceed 
144 square inches or shall be 
designated/approved to prevent flame or 
ember penetration into the structure. 
Vents not allowed in under-eave areas. 
Gable end and dormer vents shall be >10 
feet from lot line. Underfloor vent 
openings located as close to grade as 
practical.  
Vents covered by 1/8-inch mesh screen 
or use of vents designed to resist flame 
intrusion and embers. Vents not allowed 
in under eave area. 
General Requirement for vents to 
resist intrusion of embers and flame 
through ventilation openings. 1/16 to 
1/8-inch mesh screening is specified. 
Vents not allowed in under-eave area 
unless vent has been accepted as 
ember and flame-resistant. 
Exterior Walls 
Siding Specifies compliance with one of five 
methods: 1) one-hour fire-resistant rated 
construction, 2) approved noncombustible 
materials, 3) heavy timber or log wall 
construction, 4) fire-retardant treated 
wood on exterior side, 5) ignition-
resistant materials on treated side. 
Specifies ignition-resistant material 
(including exterior fire-retardant treated 
wood) or an assembly with a minimum 
of one-hour fire rating. Six-inch 
noncombustible vertical separation 
required between a horizontal surface 
and siding. 
Four options for compliance: 1) 
noncombustible material, 2) ignition-
resistant material, 3) heavy timber 
construction, 4) log wall assembly, or 
5) assembly complying with State Fire 
Marshal 12-7A-1 (10-minute direct 
flame exposure test). 
Windows At a minimum, all windows (including 
doors and skylights) shall be dual pane 
(multilayered) with tempered glass, or 
glass blocks or fire resistant rated of not 
less than 20 minutes. 
Requires all windows (including in 
doors and skylights) to be tempered 
glass, multilayered glazed panels, glass 
block, or fire-resistance rating of not less 
than 20 minutes. 
Four options for compliance: 1) multi-
pane glazing with a minimum of one 
tempered pane, 2) glass block units, 3) 
fire-resistance rating of not less than 
20 minutes, or 4) meeting 
performance requirements of SFM 12-
7A-2 
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Comparison of WUI Codes and Standards 
Component IWUIC (2018) Ignition-Resistant 
Class 1 
NFPA 1144 (2018) California Building Code 
Chapter 7A (2013) 
Doors Approved noncombustible construction, 
solid-core wood not less than 1 3/4 -
inches thick, or fire protection rating of 
not less than 20 minutes. 
Solid-core wood not less than 1 ¾  -
inches thick, constructed of 
noncombustible material, or fire 
protection rating of not less than 20 
minutes.  
Four options for compliance: 1) 
Noncombustible exterior surface or 
cladding, 2) solid core wood meeting 
thickness specifications, 3) fire 
resistance rating of not less than 20 
minutes, or 4) meeting the 
performance requirements of SFM 
Standard 12-7A-1. 
Decks One-hour fire-resistant-rated construction, 
heavy timber construction, or constructed 
with noncombustible materials or fire 
retarded treated wood or other ignition-
resistant materials. A deck extending over 
a slope greater than 10% must be 
enclosed to within 6 inches of the ground 
using same exterior wall construction 
standards. 
Requires heavy timber, noncombustible 
materials, fire-retardant treated wood, or 
other ignition-resistant material, or be a 
one-hour fire-resistance rated assembly.  
Only applies to the walking surfaces 
of the deck. Four options for 
compliance: 1) ignition resistant 
material that complies with SFM 
Standard 12-7A-4, 2) exterior fire-
retardant wood, 3) noncombustible 
material, or 4) comply with SFM 
Standard 12-7A-4. 
Near-Home Landscaping 
Near-Home Landscaping Does not explicitly address near-home 
landscaping but addresses fuel 
modification in 30+-foot defensible space 
area. 
Does not explicitly address near-home 
landscaping but addresses location and 
maintenance of vegetation in two zones, 
including from the home to 30-feet, and 
from 30-feet to 100-feet, or to the 
property line.  
Hazardous vegetation and fuel 
management required based on 
different fire hazard severity zones. 
Does not explicitly address near-home 
landscaping. 
Note: Excerpted from Headwaters Economics (Building a Wildfire-Resistant Home: Codes and Costs, 2018) 
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3.4.1. Roofing Material 
Standards for roofing material follow the same testing protocols and are designed 
to withstand three fire-related characteristics: the spread of fire into the attic, resist flame 
spread on the roof, and the ability to resist the generation of firebrands. Roofing materials 
are ranked into three classes; Class A, Class B, and Class C. Class A roofs such as 
concrete or clay roof tiles, fiberglass asphalt composition shingles, or metal offer the 
most protection against wildfire. California homes built after 2008, within all FHSZs in 
the SRA, must have a Class A roof to comply with CBC CH. 7a. California building 
codes for fire resiliency also applies to upgraded roofs for homes within the SRA built 
before 2008. However, homes within the LRA are only required to have class A roofs if 
they are in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ).  
Although building codes follow standard testing methods, it has been argued that 
testing methods cannot mimic the dynamic properties of an actual wildfire (Hakes et al., 
2017). Standardized tests do not address vulnerabilities that can occur at the edges where 
gaps can allow ember intrusion (Building a Wildfire-Resistant Home: Codes and Costs, 
2018). Furthermore, roofs are an especially vulnerable structural component as there are 
numerous places where other components, such as vents and skylights, create points of 
entry for embers. Roofs are susceptible to debris accumulation in the form of leaves and 
pine needles and require constant maintenance. PRC 4291 attempts to deal with the issue 
of debris accumulation on roofs by requiring that homeowners clean off roofs and 
gutters; however, compliance is rarely enforced. 
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3.4.2. Window Systems 
A study by Syphard et al. (2017) reports that homeowners in older developments 
should prioritize upgrading their windows to reduce wildfire risk. Windows provide a 
significant entry point for embers. Radiant heat from burning vegetation or structural 
materials has shown to break windows, which in turn allows ember intrusion into the 
structure (Hakes et al., 2017). Additionally, single-pane windows should be upgraded to 
double pane to reduce the thermal exposure of a wildfire to items inside the house and 
near windows. Double pane and triple-pane windows are also less likely to crack or break 
due to heat exposure or flying debris (Syphard et al., 2017).  
Large scale studies by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
revealed that dual pane, tempered glass is unlikely to fail due to radiant heat from a 
wildfire (Hakes et al., 2017). Heat fluxes by direct flame contact can range from 20 
kW/m2 – 70 kW/m2 depending upon what is burning. Typical heat fluxes during a 
wildfire often only reach 35 kW/m2. A NIST study found that dual pane windows 
exposed to radiant heat at 35 kW/m2  for 25 minutes did not fail (Hakes et al., 2017). 
These findings support recommendations for codes and standards for construction in the 
WUI. 
3.4.3. Exterior siding and Eave Assembly  
WUI building codes allow for the use of combustible and noncombustible 
materials for exterior wall and eave construction that meet fire-resistant guidelines 
(Building a Wildfire-Resistant Home: Codes and Costs, 2018). However, the use of 
ignition resistant material is always preferred, and combustible materials that meet fire-
resistant guidelines should be used conservatively. Testing for exterior walls does not 
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address flame spread vertically, or flame spread characteristics to other components. 
Large surface areas make exterior siding extremely vulnerable to radiant heat and direct 
flame impingement. (Hakes et al., 2017). As such, keeping debris and flammable material 
away from homes is as crucial as the siding itself (Hakes et al., 2017). 
3.4.4. Home Attachments (Decks, Porches, Fences) 
The treatment of home attachments in building codes is complex, and there has 
been little research on structural vulnerability due to building components such as fences 
and decks. IWUIC and NFPA codes limit decking construction to ignition resistant 
materials. Whereas CBC CH. 7a restricts decking materials based on the heat release rate 
of certain materials. Solid wood and plastic decking materials comply with CBC CH.7a 
but not with NFPA 1144 nor IWUIC (Building a Wildfire-Resistant Home: Codes and 
Costs, 2018). Both NFPA and IWUIC require ignition resistant decking materials, which 
are rated as noncombustible or ignition resistant such as steel framing and aluminum 
decking or pressure treated exterior fire-retardant-treated lumber.  
Further discrepancies among codes and standards regarding decking components 
exist in their structural support systems. CBC CH. 7a only requires that the walking 
surfaces of decks comply with standards, and therefore, structural support beams do not 
need to comply with fire-resistant standards, whereas IWUIC and NFPA standards 
require structural support systems to be constructed of materials that have a fire-




California wildfires have destroyed tens of thousands of homes, cost hundreds of 
human lives, and displaced hundreds of thousands of people (Syphard, 2019). Globally, 
wildfires have caused escalating economic, social, and environmental damage (Kramer et 
al., 2019). At the time of this writing, Australian bushfires are wreaking havoc across the 
Australasia, scorching millions of acres and displacing thousands. The frequency of these 
types of events in recent years and the likelihood that these types of events will continue 
has created a sense of urgency to discover the underlying factors contributing to structure 
loss (Syphard, 2019).  
There is a myriad of wildland fire policies affecting communities of all sizes 
(Brzuszek & Walker, 2008). Widespread adoption of WUI codes and standards outside of 
the SRA is inconsistent (Building a Wildfire-Resistant Home: Codes and Costs, 2018). 
Traditional methods of vegetation (fuels) management in the form of defensible space has 
been the primary focus of mitigation policy for decades and continues to receive the most 
attention (Syphard et al., 2014). However, there is little empirical evidence demonstrating 
the effectiveness of defensible space up to 100 ft., the typical distance required for 
compliance (Syphard, 2019).  
 Syphard et al. (2014) found that the most effective defensible space treatment 
was between 16-58 ft. from the structure with no additional benefit beyond that (Syphard 
et al., 2014). Moreover, defensible space has been shown to be most effective in WUI 
intermix communities rather than in WUI interface communities where wildfires cause 
the most significant amount of structure loss (Kramer et al., 2019). Despite this seeming 
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dichotomy, Cal Fire deploys an army of defensible space inspectors throughout the state 
each fire season to enforce CA PRC 4291 on SRA land regardless of the type of 
development or housing arrangement. Individual contract counties and local homeowner 
associations have stricter guidelines than those required on SRA land. However, these 
stricter guidelines rely on “expert opinion” or outdated research (Syphard et al., 2014). 
Except for SRA land in CA, widespread adoption of WUI codes and standards is 
sporadic (Building a Wildfire-Resistant Home: Codes and Costs, 2018). Within the 
context of LRA land, numerous legal loopholes provide leeway for communities to keep 
land from being designated as VHFHSZ. Many communities cite reductions in property 
value and rising insurance costs as reasons to stay away from the designation (Troy, 
2007). The lack of consistency amongst neighboring communities, coupled with lax 
enforcement, creates undue burden and confusion for homeowners.  
Building regulations and mitigation policies are ineffective if not enforced. 
Societal response to risk management at a local level, where the most significant control 
over mitigation occurs, is problematic (Winter et al., 2009). Compliance in the absence of 
enforcement is not practical. The seat belt compliance rate rose from 14 percent in 1984 
to nearly 70 percent by 1998 as more states adopted seat belt legislation and strict 
enforcement (NHTSA, 1999). Without increased enforcement and programs designed to 
aid the financial burden of mitigation, homeowner compliance for the very policies 
designed to protect them will suffer.  
Structure loss due to wildfire is complex and is the product of numerous variables 
(Keeley, Safford, Fotheringham, Franklin, & Moritz, 2009). Knowledge of structural 
ignition has advanced significantly over the last several decades (Hakes et al., 2017), yet; 
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structures are still burning at alarming rates. Meaningful gains can be made towards 
protecting communities through increased public awareness and education, enforcement, 
and standardized building standards and codes across jurisdictional boundaries. Simply 






CHAPTER 4. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO STRUCTURE LOSS 
ON THE THOMAS FIRE 
4.1.  Introduction  
Even with ever-increasing budgets dedicated to fighting wildfires and 
strengthening of codes and regulations to make communities more fire-resilient, losses to 
the built and natural environment are on a steep, upward trend in both California and 
throughout many parts of the world.  Indeed, 15 of the top 20 most destructive wildfires 
in California history occurred in the 5-year period between 2015-2020, causing 158 
fatalities and destroying 42,418 buildings. 
Increasing WUI fire losses are due to a myriad of factors, including burgeoning 
development in fire-prone areas (Dicus et al. 2014), fuel accumulation following a 
century of fire exclusion policies (Keane et al. 2002), structures built with materials that 
are not ignition-resistant (Cohen, 2000), climate change heightening fire hazards 
(Westerling 2006, Dicus 2009), social reluctance to modify residential landscaping 
(Dicus and Scott 2006), lax enforcement of defensible space laws (Dicus et al. 2009), and 
others.  Nowhere is this trend more apparent than in California.  The steadily increasing 
trend of devastating WUI fires was initiated by the 1991 Oakland Hills fire, which killed 
25 people, injured 150 others, destroyed 2,843 single-family dwellings and 437 apartment 
and condominium units, and caused an economic loss estimated at $1.5 billion (FEMA 
1992).  Since the 1991 Oakland Hills Fire, 23 more fires in California have burned 500 or 
more structures, including 14 that destroyed over 1,000 buildings (California Department 




It is clear that mitigation reduces the risk of structural loss.  For example, San 
Diego County adopted construction standards in 2001 and strengthened those codes in 
2004; subsequently, the rates of home loss were significantly lower during the 2007 fire 
storms for structures built to the new code compared to older residences that were built 
before building standards were enacted (Leyshon 2015).   
Strengthening (or in many places, simply implementing) WUI fire regulations is 
increasingly being looked at to reduce wildland fire losses.  Unfortunately, the efficacy of 
such regulations is sometimes difficult to assess before actual fire events. Further, the 
regulations work only in so far as they are enforced. 
Not surprisingly, the large number of WUI losses in California have led to the 
most stringent fire regulations in the United States. For example, to mitigate heat 
exposure to buildings, 30.48 m of vegetative “defensible space” is required around all 
structures in the State Responsibility Area (SRA), which is where the state has primary 
fire suppression responsibilities (Public Resource Code 4291).  Further, to make 
buildings more ignition resistant, Chapter 7A of the California Fire Code (first enacted in 
2008) dictates standards for materials and assembly for new construction in the SRA, 
including minimum standards for roofing, vents, exterior coverings, exterior windows 
and doors, decking, and accessory structures. Many other regulations (e.g., water storage 
and road standards) have also been enacted to aid in firefighter and residential response 
during a wildfire.  These SRA standards are commonly increased in Local Responsibility 
Areas (LRA), where local jurisdictions have primary fire suppression responsibilities. 
Unfortunately, the actual effectiveness of specific elements in existing WUI fire 




stems from performance testing being conducted in a controlled laboratory setting that 
focuses on materials and/or assembly of individual elements of a building.  During a 
wildfire, there is simply much greater variability in conditions that could lead to 
structural ignition, which cannot be accounted for in a laboratory setting that commonly 
isolates a single building element.  For example, during a wildfire, a building component 
could simultaneously be exposed to an ember storm, intense radiant or convective heat, 
and direct flame impingement.  Obviously, one cannot create an experiment where local 
communities are subjected to a large, high-intensity wildfire, but researchers can quantify 
the relative importance of structural and property features following a wildfire and assess 
the relative effectiveness of these traits on home survivability.   
To that end, this study focuses on how various physical traits of a given property 
impacted the survivability of structures during the first 48 hours of the 2017 Thomas Fire 
in Ventura and Santa Barbara Counties in California (Figure 10).  The Thomas Fire, 
which was driven by strong Santa Ana winds in largely chaparral shrublands, destroyed 
1,063 structures, caused two fatalities, cost over $200 million to suppress (California 
Department of Forestry & Fire Protection 2017b) and caused over $1.8 billion in 
insurable losses (Ding 2018).  Further exacerbating the destruction there, post-fire 
mudslides (a common secondary disaster that follows wildfires in California) occurred 
within weeks of full fire containment, killing 21 people and destroying over 400 










This research, which seeks to provide quantifiable evidence of the effectiveness of 
various property traits on structural survivability, is intended to better inform 
policymakers (and residents) so that they can more effectively mitigate wildland fire 
hazards and thereby reduce the cycle of repetitive wildfire costs and losses in the 
wildland-urban interface.   
4.2. Methodology 
4.2.1.  Site Description 
Of the 1,063 structures destroyed in the Thomas Fire, 803 were single-family 
homes and are the focus of this study. The extent to which outbuildings and auxiliary 
structures meet building requirements is inconsistent, and accurate data collection is 
challenging. For this reason, we focused on habitable, single-family homes, which made 
up the bulk of the destruction.  
The study area consisted of a region of the 113,970 ha of the final Thomas Fire 
footprint, which was chosen because it reflected the initial stages of the fire, when wind 
speeds were extreme and suppression forces were limited.  A sample of 222 destroyed 
single-family homes within a WUI interface community in the city of Ventura was 
selected as the study area (Figure 11). The specific rationale for the building selection 
process will be discussed in the statistical analysis section that follows. The study area 
consisted of homes that burned in the first 48 hours of the Thomas Fire under extreme 










4.2.2.  Data Sources  
Initially, we intended to explore how structural survivability was influenced by a 
myriad of property features, including the degree of defensible space on a given property, 
specific building components (especially those that are addressed in Chapter 7A of the 
California Building Code), fire behavior at the time of fire passage, presence of 
suppression resources, and others. Unfortunately, much of the desired data proved 
impossible to acquire.   
For example, numerous studies have shown that the type of windows, roofs, 
eaves, and siding plays a vital role in protecting a homes against wildfire (Hakes et al., 
2017; Syphard et al., 2017). We had originally hoped to utilize the Damage Inspection 
(DINS) report that was produced by the State (which provides information on these and 
other property attributes) for these data on specific residences. Unfortunately, most of the 
values in the Thomas Fire DINS report were either blank or were considered unreliable.  
Thus, the Thomas Fire DINS report was largely used for simply determining the type of 
structure on a given damaged property (e.g., single-family residence, commercial, etc.) 
and the extent of damage that the building incurred (e.g., Superficial to Destroyed), 
which was based upon the percentage of the building damaged.  Further, all homes 
included in the study were built circa 1975, well before Chapter 7A building codes were 
enacted in 2008, and thus it was impossible to determine if the current construction 
standards impacted structural survivability.   
As a further means to gain data on building attributes at the time of the Thomas 
Fire, we also attempted to utilize pertinent building data from Zillow, which is an online 




maintains data about construction materials for given residences, but they only publicly 
provide data for homes that are actively on the real estate market; a request to Zillow for 
data for the study was denied. Further attempts to retrieve construction data from the 
Ventura County assessor’s office were made; however, their office only maintains basic 
data, such as square footage and lot size, and does not have data on building materials 
used or upgrades.  Thus, without a baseline of standards or reliable building information, 
the impact of home construction attributes on home survivability was impossible to 
assess.   
Additional attempts to assess features that could potentially influence structural 
survivability also proved fruitless.  For example, heat exposure at time of fire passage on 
a given property (which could potentially be reconstructed via fire behavior modeling) 
could not be determined due to limited knowledge of the specific timing of fire 
progression in the early stages of the fire.  Similarly, it proved impossible to determine if 
suppression resources took defensive action on a given residence when the property was 
exposed to heat and embers.   
We also purposefully chose not to assess how the topographic slope on which a 
given structure was located as a factor in structural survivability because the Thomas Fire 
ignited and initially spread under an extreme foehn (Santa Ana) wind event. Foehn winds 
dominate fire behavior and override local, diurnal wind patterns. (“Estimating Winds for 
Fire Behavior | NWCG,” n.d.). Local topographic features that generally affect fire 
behavior in predictable patterns are inconsistent under foehn wind conditions, and 





Because of multiple unexpected data challenges, we were therefore limited to 
only assessing how building survivability was impacted by the type of vegetation and the 
degree of defensible space (in increasing distances from a given building footprint), and 
the presence and type of fencing on a given property.  
Spatial data collection for this study came from numerous governmental and 
digital sources (Table 5). Visual inspection using satellite imagery was used to improve 
the accuracy of some spatial data.  For example, pre-fire visual assessment utilizing 
Google Earth imagery (“Google Earth Pro,” 2019) and Google Street View (“Google,” 
2011) revealed that much of the location data from the DINS report were inaccurate, in 
that point locations were not applied to specific rooftop locations. Cross-referencing 
through visual inspection with Google imagery was therefore used to assign each 
structure’s available attributes to its corresponding location, which was relegated to only 
the presence of a fence and whether it was combustible or non-combustible.  
Because DINS reports only provides information about burned structures, data for 
unburned structures were acquired from county governmental organizations. The extent 
of the data varies from county to county. As such, it was difficult to obtain accurate and 
consistent data across jurisdictional boundaries.  
Future post-fire investigations could be improved and expedited if a data 













County of Ventura 
Information 





attributes for each 
structure damaged or 
destroyed as a result 
of the Thomas Fire.  
Many point locations 
did not match home 
addresses.  
Missing structure 




building footprints  
Ventura County 
Assessor's Office 
Building footprints for 
all structures within 
the Thomas Fire 
perimeter in Ventura 
county. 
Ventura county only. 
Some footprints did 
not match actual 
building footprint. 
Many footprints 
needed to be adjusted 





Building footprints for 
Santa Barbara County 
Footprints required 





Parcel data  
Ventura County 
Assessor's Office 
Parcels in Ventura 
County 
N/A 




Parcels in Santa 
Barbara County 
N/A 





Ventura and Santa 
Barbara imagery 














4.2.3. . Spatial Data Processing 
Imagery during 2016, which was obtained from the National Agriculture Imagery 
Program (NAIP), was used as a base map that allowed for the analysis of pre-fire 
landcover around structures (Figure 12).  Because we needed to determine both the 
abundance and type of vegetation at a fine scale, pre-fire vegetation within the study site 
was determined using a supervised image classification technique utilizing ArcGIS Pro in 
conjunction with NAIP imagery at a 0.6-meter resolution (Figure 13).  
 
Figure 12. Raw Imagery obtained from NAIP for a neighborhood in the study area. 
 
Ventura County Information Technology Services Department provided 
shapefiles for point locations of damaged homes and building footprints for all homes in 




addresses were incorrect, or structures were labeled as a primary residence when, in fact, 
they were outbuildings, which required extensive data editing. To accurately represent 
the structure location, building footprints were shifted and resized to fit the NAIP 
imagery. 
Utilizing the 2016 NAIP imagery, the image classification wizard within ArcGIS 
Pro was used to create training samples of the desired vegetative classification categories. 
In this case, the intent was to distinguish different types of vegetation and development. 
Training samples were used to identify pixels in eight distinct classes: landscape 
vegetation, lawn, asphalt, concrete, developed, woodland, annual grasses, and wildland 
shrub. 
LANDFIRE, a database of publicly available spatial data commonly used by land 
managers (Rollins, 2009), was considered for use in this study. However, the 30 m 
resolution was too large for individual parcel analysis and the vegetative classifications at 
the site consisted of only two classifications, including “non-burnable” and “shrub”.  





Figure 13 Vegetation Classification using LANDFIRE Data at 30m Resolution.  
 Note the grey area is classified as “non-burnable.” Most structures destroyed from the Thomas Fire were in 
non-burnable areas. 
 
Figure 14 Vegetation Classification using ArcGIS Pro at 0.6m Resolution.  





Fire behavior can vary dramatically based on different fuel types and associated 
moisture and chemical components. Classification categories with similar expected fire 
behavior were grouped together in the final analysis. Asphalt and concrete were grouped 
together in the final analysis as a “non-burnable” category. Lawn and landscape 
vegetation classifications are based on irrigated, green vegetation with high moisture 
content. These categories were grouped together as “landscape vegetation” due to similar 
expected fire activity. 
 Classification types included in the final analysis are defined as follows: 
• Landscape Vegetation- Irrigated, ornamental grasses, shrubs, and forbs 
with high foliar moisture.  
• Non-Burnable- Asphalt road surfaces and concrete infrastructure 
• Developed- Housing units and structures 
• Woodland- Native oaks and hardwoods 
• Annual Grasses- Non irrigated, native or invasive, annual wild grasses 
• Wildland Shrub- Chapparal and coastal sage scrub plant communities 
We conducted a Supervised Image Classification with an object-based 
classification using training samples and the 4-band NAIP imagery. The output raster was 
further generalized using the generalization tools outlined within ArcGIS Pro. The initial 
raster output was pixelated and misclassified some vegetation. Training samples using 
visual observation were created to “smooth” the data and classify the final raster.  The 
workflow of converting the initial raster classification to the final raster output raster is 




then converted to polygons using the Raster to Polygon spatial analyst tool to represent 





Figure 15 Classification of Locations 
 
Initial output raster after classification 
Remove misclassified cells with Majority Filter 
Repeat Majority Filter 
Identify clusters with Region Group 
Remove areas smaller than a threshold 





Three buffer zones of increasing distance from around the footprint for each of 
the 444 selected homes in the study. We used the Multi-Ring Buffer tool in ArcGIS Pro 
to create these buffers at the specified distances below (Figure 16). These zones are based 
on NFPA and are also similar to defensible space zones categorized within California 
Public Resources Code 4291, which are a group of State regulations intended to reduce 
home ignition during a wildfire. 
The specific zones include: 
• Zone -A: 0 m – 1.5 m Immediate zone 
• Zone -B: 1.5 m – 9 m Intermediate zone 
Zone – C: 9 m – 30 m Extended zone  





We calculated the percentage of each of the 6 land cover types in each of the 3 
buffer zones around each structure. These summary statistics were then used to form the 
basis of the logistical regression model during the statistical analysis phase.  
4.2.4. Statistical Analysis  
I utilized a matched pair statistical technique in this study.  This approach is an 
observational study technique that evaluates the effect of a treatment (in this case, 
wildfire) by comparing adjacent burned and unburned homes (Figure 17) that share many 
similar characteristics (via a visual assessment of lot size, house age, landscaping, etc.) 
(Stuart, 2010). Our strategy was to choose homes that had sustained major damage (51-
75%) or that were destroyed (>75%) as categorized in the Thomas Fire DINS report. We 
chose to focus on single-family residences that had sustained major damage because they 
offered the most consistent and accurate data in the DINS report. Of the total 1,063 
structures that sustained major damage (i.e., 51-75% damage) or were destroyed (i.e., 






Figure 17 Example of paired homes for analysis 
The specific study area within the Thomas Fire footprint (Figure 11) was chosen 
because that geographic area had the highest degree of home loss that occurred during 
similar weather conditions, and also had the greatest opportunity to find burned/unburned 
home pairs (508 of the total 699 burned, single-family homes that met the damage criteria 
are within the specific study area).  These buildings sustained damage during the first 48 
hours of The Thomas Fire, when Santa Ana wind conditions were extreme and fire 
response was limited. Of the 508 homes that met the damage criteria within the study 
area, a subsample of 222 damaged or destroyed homes were selected because they were 
located immediately adjacent to an unburned home. The neighboring properties were then 
analyzed using the matched pair statistical technique for vegetation type and for 




The paired analysis controls for confounding variables that may have been present 
during the fire, such as differing wind conditions or presence of suppression resources. 
Paired houses are considered to share similar attributes (i.e., home age, lot size, square 
footage, etc.) and to have been influenced by the same weather conditions. The study area 
consists of tract homes that were all built circa 1975 and the average lot size is 0.3 acres. 
The study area is an example of a traditional WUI interface community where there is a 
distinct border between urban development and wildland vegetation.  Due to relatively 
small parcel size, neighboring properties share a similar physical setting. 
We conducted a binary logistical regression model using SPSS software (“SPSS 
Software | IBM,” 2013) to examine the relationship between property features and home 
survival.  Initial explanatory variables that were included in the logistical regression 
model included the percentage of a specific land cover (i.e., developed, wildland shrub, 
woodland, landscape vegetation, grasses, and non-burnable) within each of the three 
increasing buffer zones around each structure (i.e., 0-1.5 m, 1.5-9.0 m, and 9.0-30.0 m). 
Fence type (i.e., combustible, non-combustible, and none) was also included in the 
logistic regression model.  
A stepwise selection technique was used to reduce the logistic regression model to 
identify variables of statistical significance at α = 0.05. Stepwise selection is a process by 
which the model initially includes all available variables, and then systematically 
removes the least important factors until only those variables with statistical significance 







For each of the three increasing buffer zones around a house (i.e., 0-1.5 m, 1.5-9.0 
m, and 9.0-30.0 m), coefficients of specific variables utilized in the logistical regression 
model and their statistical significance follow.  Nomenclature for the percentage of a 
given land cover type that occupied a given buffer zone is “Pct_(Cover Type)_(Buffer 
Size)”.  Thus, the percentage of the 1.5 m buffer that was occupied by the Non-burnable 
land cover type would be “Pct_Non-Burnable_1.5”. 
4.3.1. Zone A: 0.0-1.5 m Around a Home 
A Chi-square test (Table 5) showed that the logistical regression model developed 
for the 0.0-1.5 m buffer zone was a significant predictor of whether a home burned or not 
(χ2 = 30.810, p < .001). The calculated Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 indicated that the model 
accounted for 8.9% of the total observed variance.  
In the 1.5-meter (~5 feet) buffer zone, the percentage occupied by the “non-
burnable” (asphalt and concrete) cover type and the presence of a non-combustible fence 
were significant predictors in determining structural survivability during the Thomas Fire 
(α = 0.05; Table 6). No other land cover type was statistically significant. Within this 
zone closest to a house, each percentage point increase of “non-burnable” landscaping 
increased the odds of a house surviving by 1680% (p = 0.033). Also, within the 1.5 m 
buffer, the presence of a non-combustible fence increased the odds of a home 









Step 30.810 8 <0.001 
Block 30.810 8 <0.001 
Model 30.810 8 <0.001 
 
Table 6 Logistic Regression of house survivability in the buffer zone 1.5 meters around a home (N=444).   
Effects B SE Exp (B) LL UL p 
Constant -3.38  0.03   0.011 
       
Fencing      0.000 
         None 0.38 .48 1.47 0.58 3.74 0.422 
Combustible 0.48 0.44 1.61 0.68 3.84 0.279 
Non-Combustible 1.34 0.43 3.80 1.64 8.81 0.002 
Pct_Landscape_1.5 2.90 1.54 18.18 0.88 374.32 0.060 
Pct_Non_Burnable_1.5 2.88 1.35 17.81 1.27 250.66 0.033 
Pct_Developed_1.5 2.31 1.41 10.10 0.64 160.40 0.101 
Pct_Woodland_1.5 1.42 2.45 4.15 0.03 503.91 0.561 
Pct_Grasses_1.5 2.88 1.60 17.75 0.78 406.23 0.072 
 
4.3.2. Zone B: 1.5-9.0 m Around a Home 
A Chi-square test (Table 7) showed that the logistical regression model developed 
for the 1.5-9.0 m buffer zone was a significant predictor of whether a home burned or not 
(χ2=34.933, p<0.001). The calculated Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 indicated that the model 
accounted for 10.1% of the total observed variance. 
In the 1.5-9.0-meter (~5-30 feet) buffer zone, no land cover type was a significant 




the presence of a non-combustible fence within the 9m buffer zone was significant 
(p=0.002) and increased the odds of home survivability by 280%.  
 




Step 34.933 8 .000 
Block 34.933 8 .000 
Model 34.933 8 .000 
 
Table 8 Logistic Regression of house survivability in the buffer zone 1.5-9.0 meters around a home 
(N=444).  
Effects B SE Exp (B) LL UL p 
Constant -5.462  0.004   0.085 
       
Fencing      0.000 
         None 0.27 .48 1.31 0.51 3.40 0.575 
Combustible 0.44 0.44 1.60 0.66 3.70 0.314 
Non-Combustible 1.40 0.43 3.90 1.70 9.10 0.002 
Pct_Landscape_9 4.90 3.30 133.15 0.22 79664.22 0.134 
Pct_Non_Burnable_9 5.68 3.20 264.28 .48 145420.81 0.083 
Pct_Developed_9 2.50 3.51 12.31 0.01 11875.24 0.474 
Pct_Woodland_9 3.90 4.00 51.00 0.02 118995.20 0.321 









4.3.3. Zone C: 9.0-30.0 m Around a Home 
A Chi-square test (Table 9) showed that the logistical regression model developed 
for the 9.0-30.0 m buffer zone was a significant predictor of whether a home burned or 
not (χ2=43.913, p<0.001). The calculated Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 indicated that the model 
accounted for 12.6% of the total observed variance. 
In the 9.0-30.0-meter (~30-100 feet) buffer zone, the percentage occupied by 
“non-burnable” land cover type, the percentage occupied by the “landscape vegetation”, 
and the presence of a non-combustible fence type were significant predictors in 
determining structural survivability during the Thomas Fire (α = 0.05; Table 10). Within 
this zone farthest from a house, each percentage increase of “Non-Burnable” cover type 
increased the odds of house survivability by 165,566%.  Additionally, each percentage 
increase of “Landscape Vegetation” cover type increases the odds of a house not burning 
by 275,594%. Finally, the presence of a non-combustible fence increased the odds of a 



















Step 43.913 8 .000 
Block 43.913 8 .000 
Model 43.913 8 .000 
 
Table 10 Logistic Regression of house survivability in the buffer zone 9.0-30.0 meters around a home 
(N=444). 
Effects B SE Exp (B) LL UL p 
Constant -6.871  0.001   0.060 
       
Fencing      0.000 
         None 0.14 .49 1.15 0.44 3.00 0.772 
Combustible 0.32 0.46 1.40 0.56 3.40 0.480 
Non-Combustible 1.28 0.44 3.60 1.53 8.50 0.003 
Pct_Landscape_30 7.92 3.83 2755.944 1.53 4977565.00 0.038 
Pct_Non_Burnable_30 7.41 3.86 1655.674 1.10 2609494.00 0.048 
Pct_Developed_30 2.91 3.91 18.33 0.01 38977.90 0.457 
Pct_Woodland_30 3.00 4.60 19.38 0.00 153751.24 0.518 
Pct_Grasses_30 6.42 4.20 612.60 0.17 2153649.00 0.123 
 
4.3.4. All Zones: 0.0-30.0 m Around a Home 
When all three buffer zones were combined into a single buffer, a Chi-square test 
(Table 11) showed that the logistical regression model developed for the 0.0-100.0 m 
buffer zone was a significant predictor of whether a home burned or not (χ2=43.326, 
p<0.001). The calculated Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 indicated that the model accounted for 




In the combined 0.0-30.0-meter (~0-100 feet) buffer zone, no land cover type was 
a significant predictor in home survivability during the Thomas Fire (α = 0.05; Table 12).  
However, the presence of a non-combustible fence in the combined buffer zone was 
significant (p=0.003) and increased the odds of home survivability by 280%. (α = 0.05; 
Table 4.7). Within this zone farthest from a house, each percentage increase of “Non-
Burnable” cover type increased the odds of house survivability by 273%.   




Step 49.326 18 .000 
Block 49.326 18 .000 






Table 12 Logistic Regression on whether a house burned or not including all variables at all distances 
(N=444) 
Effects B SE Exp (B) LL UL p 
Constant -8.984  0.000   0.045 
       
Fencing      0.000 
         None 0.14 .49 1.15 0.44 3.03 0.774 
Combustible 0.34 0.47 1.41 0.56 3.53 0.466 
Non-Combustible 1.32 0.45 3.73 1.55 8.50 0.003 
Pct_Landscape_1.5 3.05 1.84 21.20 .57 8.99 0.097 
Pct_Non_Burnable_1.5 2.44 1.58 11.47 .52 783.97 0.123 
Pct_Developed_1.5 2.30 1.96 9.94 .40 254.02 0.162 
Pct_Woodland_1.5 2.76 .72 15.83 .03 247.92 0.396 
Pct_Grasses_1.5 
 
3.01 2.43 20.29 .46 9294.26 0.119 
Pct_WildlandSh_1.5       
Pct_Landscape_9 -.12 .001 .88 .00 1903.84 0.975 
Pct_Non_Burnable_9 .67 .030 1.96 .00 3782.46 0.862 
Pct_Developed_9 -1.32 .098 .27 .00 1012.03 0.754 
Pct_Woodland_9 .79 .027 2.20 .00 27723.37 0.870 
Pct_Grasses_9 -.28 .01 .76 .00 2348.235 0.945 
Pct_WildlandSh_9       
Pct_Landscape_30 7.40 3.97 1641.37 .66 4055222.45 0.063 
Pct_Non_Burnable_30 6.83 3.92 921.04 .42 2012248.84 0.082 
Pct_Developed_30 2.96 4.08 19.268 0.01 56925.46 0.468 
Pct_Woodland_30 2.54 4.74 12.64 0.00 137942.46 0.593 
Pct_Grasses_30 6.07 4.35 430.70 0.09 2177987.44 0.163 







4.4.1. Relevant Findings 
The most consistent predictor of structural survivability within the study area was 
the presence of a non-combustible fence.  California has some of the strictest building 
guidelines in the US for homes built in the WUI. However, the use of noncombustible 
fences has been widely ignored or simply suggested as a recommendation rather than an 
enforceable regulation. We found that the odds of home survival increased dramatically if 
a noncombustible fence was present on a given property.   
Unfortunately, some recently devastated communities continue to attach 
combustible fences to newly built homes, thereby placing the structure at future risk even 
if the newly built home is compliant to Chapter 7A standards.  Thus, the negative impact 
of combustible fencing on structural survivability should be emphasized when fire 
management professionals engage with residents about wildfire risk reduction strategies. 
We found that the type of fence attached to a structure (i.e., combustible vs. non-
combustible) was a more significant predictor of home survivability than defensible 
space. This does not suggest that defensible space is ineffective or should be ignored. 
Indeed, we found that irrigated landscaping within the 30m buffer zone and non-burnable 
landcover in both the 1.5m and 30m zones is significant at promoting structural 
survivability.  
Within the 1.5m buffer zone, we found that the non-burnable cover type (i.e., 
concrete, gravel, etc.) significantly increased the potential for home survival. This finding 
is significant because many residents commonly place combustible mulch or vegetation 




Walker, 2008; Syphard et al., 2017)that found that combustible material of any type 
should be avoided immediately next to a given home. Smoldering embers can linger in 
combustible materials well after the initial fire front passes, and a home can readily ignite 
after suppression resources have relocated to other parts of the fire.  
We also found that within the 30m buffer zone around a given house (the State-
mandated zone for defensible space implementation), increasing presence of irrigated 
landscape vegetation and non-burnable land cover types around a home substantially 
improved the probability its survivability, even in the older homes that were exposed to 
the early stages of the Thomas Fire when winds were extreme and suppression resources 
were limited.   
Unfortunately, many WUI communities have high-density housing, and residents 
living there rarely have control of factors 30m or, even at times, 3m from their homes due 
to relatively small property sizes. Defensible space policies generally only require 
compliance up to the property line regardless of the conditions on the neighboring 
property. This characteristic of small property size in relationship to current defensible 
space regulations clearly illustrates the need for community-level mitigation policies (vs. 
current parcel-level policies) to best reduce wildfire risk in a given community.   
Initially, the overarching goal of this study was to evaluate how a myriad of 
pertinent physical variables impacted home loss during a wildfire, but there were multiple 
data limitations that impacted the robustness of the analysis in this study. First, as noted, 
the Thomas Fire DINS report contained numerous missing and incorrect data, including 
address locations and extent of damage at a given property. For example, Google Earth 




Similarly, while the standard DINS report template includes potential inputs for 
eaves, roof type, exterior siding, window type, and accessory structures on a given 
property, most of these values were null in the Thomas Fire DINS report.  The prevalence 
of both incomplete and inaccurate data highlights the need for improved data literacy and 
training for those tasked with post-fire damage inspection. 
As noted, lack of other relevant data (e.g., site-specific weather, fire behavior, 
suppression actions, etc.) also limited our original vision of data analysis.  To control for 
these and other confounding variables, we therefore elected to employ the matched pair 
statistical technique described in 4.2.4. In this type of analysis, we were forced to assume 
that pairs of adjacent, neighboring homes would have experienced mostly identical 
conditions at the time of fire exposure, which is impossible to unequivocally determine 
without direct measurement.  
Caution should be taken in applying these results in situations outside the 
conditions present in our data.  For example, the Thomas Fire burned in mostly chaparral 
fuels before entering into older developed neighborhoods (c. 1975) during an extreme 
Santa Ana wind event.  Even if another fire burned in similar wildland fuels and winds, 
home survivability would likely differ in newly built, master-planned communities where 
mitigation has been employed at multiple scales.  Even with these limitations, we are 
confident that agencies and residents can employ elements of this study to help guide and 






4.4.2. Management Implications & Future Research Needs 
There is no doubt that statewide policies such as defensible space standards 
(Public Resources Code 4291) are associated with home survivability (Keeley & 
Syphard, 2019). However, the relative effectiveness of defensible space compared to 
other factors is dependent on site-specific conditions. Current efforts to mitigate the 
impacts of increased fire activity are not proving effective at preventing structure loss 
(Kramer et al., 2019). Traditional mitigation techniques have failed to yield positive 
results during extreme wind events such as the Santa Ana winds in which the Thomas 
Fire progressed in its early stages (Keeley & Syphard, 2019).  
The Thomas Fire was not an anomaly. Thousands of structures have been 
annually destroyed by wildfire in recent years in California. As development continues to 
push further into wildland areas, the potential for further destruction is likely, especially 
if such development is conducted in a piecemeal way. The lack of effective mitigation 
strategies has resulted in increased structure loss, billions of suppression dollars spent, 
and frustration amongst residents.  
Numerous studies (Hakes et al., 2017; Syphard et al., 2017) have addressed the 
impact of various property features on home survivability during a wildfire and some 
consensus has begun to emerge.  Effective wildfire mitigation must rely on a suite of 
variables rather than individual characteristics of a given property. Initially, we planned 
to assess various construction and other features in the logistic regression model to 
predict home survivability. However, the lack of complete data proved this goal 
impossible, which highlights the need for improved data literacy skills for agency 




multi-agency training on how to properly conduct DINS assessments would improve the 
quality of data for future research.  
We relied on a variety of county and state-level data sources (Table 4) to conduct 
this study. Gathering this data was a time-consuming process and often required 
communication with multiple sources within the same agency. Currently, differing type 
of data (DINS, parcel data, building footprints) are confined to individual agency 
departments. Thus, a centrally located GIS database would allow easier access for 
researchers in the future and ultimately lead to improved analysis of home survivability.  
A more extensive study of all WUI events in California that considers building 
attributes and that assess vegetation profiles at a much finer scale would also improve the 
quality of the research and ultimately inform better mitigation policy. Furthermore, a 
review and consolidation of current mitigation policies and guidelines to determine their 
effectiveness will help residents make more informed decisions and take the appropriate 
measures for their property-specific needs. 
4.4.3. Conclusions 
This study provides insight into the relative effectiveness of mitigation policies 
and guidelines. We hope to provide homeowners with options to achieve realistic and 
effective mitigation strategies. While the focus of this study is one particular fire under 
extreme wind conditions, the results can be applied to communities across southern 
California that experience similar types of wind-driven fires.  
This study reinforces the need for continued research into structural ignitions and 




as focusing exclusively on implementation of defensible space, do not address the myriad 
of factors at play during a wildfire. Agencies that solely advocate defensible space and 
fuel modification without addressing structural characteristics provide a disservice to the 
public. Homeowners of limited means could weigh whether they should focus on 
landscaping or installing a noncombustible fence. This study highlights a disconnect 
between large-scale, government-sponsored mitigation programs, and homeowners trying 
to achieve realistic risk reduction goals on their properties. Thus, mitigation efforts need 
to be tailored for individual community characteristics rather than on large scale, state, or 
federal templates.  
Effective wildfire mitigation relies on multiple factors, and government agencies 
must take a holistic approach to reduce future structural ignitions. Mitigation programs 
that consider the dynamic nature of wildfire and its response to site-specific local 
conditions (both current and predicted) will help reduce future tragedies. While there are 
many current policies in place to reduce risk of home loss, residents are often confused 
by their language, agency enforcement is inconsistent, and strategies are sometimes based 
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